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I his is a second edition of an earlier work which went to press just
as the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act was being signed on June x4,
1934. In the intervening seven year period some 3oo cases have implemented the federal statute and five additional states have adopted declaratory judgment procedure, so that now only eleven states remain without it.
Thus, since Professor Sunderland's publication of the first American article
on declaratory judgments,1 the use of the procedural device has spread like
wildfire. And Professor Borchard has now essayed-and indeed accomplished-the monumental task of integrating within the scope of roughly
iooo pages a critical analysis and learned yet smoothly flowing discussion
of nearly 300o American cases from forty jurisdictions, in addition to
approximately 3000 English and Dominion cases, for an aggregate of 6ooo.
This edition I believe to be one of the great books of America's adjective jurisprudence. Its greatness lies in its ritegration, through the
author's scholarly, lively and crusading mind, of tie distilled essences of
the 6ooo cases and of the statutes and rules with which he deals. In other
words, this is not a catalogue, or a digest, or a scissors-and-pastepot job,
or an intellectual quilt in which authorities are stitched end on end. , It is a
true textbook, in which the author's hand-and heart and mind and soul are
evident on every page. He has not only put legalistic copper and sulphur
in a test tube and mixed them up. He has applied to them an intellectual
heat which has produced an entirely new 'substance which is neither copper,
nor sulphur, nor heat.2 This new entity is the Borchard concept of what
a declaratory judgment is or ought to be.
Such concept may be summarized in what for convenience I call the
Ten Commandments
of the
Law of Declaratory Judgments
i. Advisory opinions by the judiciary may be authorized by constitutional mandate, and in some cases by legislative mandate, but such mandates
exist in only fourteen jurisdictions.
i. Sunderland, A Modern Evoltios in Remedial Rights, The Declaratory JUdg-

ment (1917) 16 MicH. L.

REv. 69%70.

Professor Borchard says, at page 13, that Sunderland is entitled 4'1t unlimited professional tribute", and he quotes the celebrated paragraphs in which Sunderland urged,

"We" do not arm our traffic pblicemen with guns and cutlasses. Why insist that the
court must always tattle the sabre."
2. "The search is for some co-ordlnating principle, whether the prineiple be rooted
in history or philosophy, in a study of what has been or in some effort of pure reason
to determine what ought to be." CmaDoz6, THE PA"DoxEs op LzAL ScIE cE (1928)
100.

3. England, Mass., Colo., Fla, Maine, N. H., R. I., S. D., Ala., DeL, Ky., Mir,
Okla., Vt. See for example, Opinion of the Justices, 3o8 Mass. 6ot, 32 N. E. (2d) 298
(s941 ; Opinion of the Justices, 307 Mass 613, 29 N. E. (2d) 738 (194o) ; Opinion of
the .ustices, 145 Mass. 587t 592 (1887); Answer of the Justices, 122 Mass. 6oo (877).
Compare the interesting discussion in Self-Insurer's Ass'n v. State Industrial Commission, 224 N. Y. 13, rig N. E. 1027 (1918). Professor Borchard recognizes a "growing demand" in the opposite direction, but he concedes that the demand has not yet
ripened into law. Some years ago a suggestion of the late Tames M. Beck that the
Supreme Court should give advisory opinions "in extraordinary instances" was roundly
denounced in Philadelphia and New York.
(87)
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2. In the absence of constitutional fiat, advisory opinions by constitutional courts are unauthorized; whether attempted under the guise of
declaratory judgments or otherwise.4
3. a) Declaratory judgments by state and federal courts are generally
authorized, except with respect to federal taxes.

b) Declaratory judgments may grant -coercive relief, including damages, in addition to declaring rights and duties.
c) If "further relief" is claimed, it should be stated in the prayer for
relief.
4. Declaratory judgments are adjudicatory. They are not advisory
opinions. They differ from advisory opinions in that they determine controversies which possess all the requisites of justiciability.,
5.Declaratory judgments are tools of the adjective law. They do
not create new substantive rights. And they are neither legal nor equitable,
but sui generis.
6. A declaratory judgment is an alternative remedy, not an extraordinary one. It may be rendered in a case where another form of action is
available.'
7. Declaratory judgment actions are not'limited to the determination
of questions of law. They may deteimine questions of fact, and a jury
trial of trinble issues of fact may be seasonably demanded.
8. a) A declaratory judgment ordinarily will not be rendered by a
court when an adequate administrative procedural device is available, unless
the circumstances are extraordinary, important public interests are at stake,
or the court finds that substantial justice will be done by ignoring the
pathway used for access to just determination;
b) The field of administrative law is opening wide to declaratory
rulings by administrative agencies.$
4.A declaratory judgment may be had only in cases of actual controversy. Itis
a final, binding judgment between adversary parties and conclusively determines their
rights. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 30') U. S. 227, 239 (1937); Nashville,

Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933).
s.See Professor Borchard's excellent analysis of what constitutes a "justiciable"
controversy at paget 33-86. At page 86 he says, "It necessarily follows that if an
action for a declaration raises issues which are fictitious, colorable, hypothetical, abstract, academic, or dead, and hence moot, the action must be dismissed as decisively
as would be any other action presenting the same no~i-justiciable issues."
6. This principle is vigorously resisted in Pennsylvania and Maryland. But I agree
with Professor Borchard that these two states should revise their views in this connection. See pages 318-342, 827, 879. and Woolard v. Schaffer Stores Co., 272 N. Y.
34 N. E. (2d) 316 (1936); Kariher's Petition (No. 1), 284 Pa. 455, 471, 131 AtL
A "Pennsylvania
§1. PA. STAT. Am.
amendment of Judge
Uniform Declaritory

muddle' has resulted from the Act of April 25. 1935, P. L 72,

(Purdon, Supp,

1,94)

tit. 12 § 836, which contained an unhappy

von Moschzisker's amendment to Section 6 of the Pennsylvania
Judgments Act of June i8. 1923, P. L 840, § 1, PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, §§831-846. C. (1937) 8s LT. oF"PA. L.RI.
317.
7. A "New York muddle has arisen since the publication of this Second Edition
by virtue of the unfortunate language in the opinion in Seventy-Nine Delancey Corp.
v. Meridan Holding Corp., 286 N. Y. 354, 26 N. E. (2d) 6ig (1941). This decision
does violence to Rule 213 of the New York Rules of Civil Practice, and it misses the
liberal spirit of Aetna v. Haworth. 3oo U. S.227 (1937), and N. Y. Foreign Trade
Zone Operators v. State Liquor Authority, 285 N. Y. 272, 34 N. E. (2d) 316 (1941).
8. After the publication of this edition, an exhaustive opinion by Mr. Jultice Rutledge, in Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell. 124 F. (2d) 235 (App. Div. D. C.
1941), held that "by no necessary implication of statutory language is there indicated
a Congressional intent that either the procedure before the [National Railway Adjust,henti Board or the statutory enforcement proceeding provided by the Railway Labor
Act of 1034 shall be exclusive". Hence, a complaint for a declaratory judgment declaring rights under a collective bargaining agreement was held valid.
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9. a) Declaratory judgments may be resorted to for civil construction
of penal legislation in lieu of embarrassing resort to criminal prosecutions,
such as those colloquially designated as "test cases".
But public policy is paramount in these litigations, and it is difficult to
evolve an objective rule to govern them.
b) The dividing line of permissibility is probably near the boundary
between .nalun prohibituin and inalum in se.
c) In the interest of judicial consistency, those actions in which
declaratory judgments must be denied for reasons of public policy should
generally be so dealt with only for the reason that "The iotive of the
plaintiff (or defendant,'as the case may be) is so uncertain that NO USEFUL
PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED by granting a declaration, and public poliey
thus requires a dismissal of the complaint in the discretion of the court."
It is judicially unwise to say more, lest the pattern of declaratory
judgment practice become an unpredictable "medley of scraps and
patches".*
io.Declaratory judgments rest in the discretion of the court, which
should give its reasons in the event that it exercises its discretion to forbid
them. In the better view, if the reason given is "untenable", the discretion
has been improperly exercised. The best "reason" generally available is
that a declaratory judgment would serve no useful purpose in the particular
case.
The foregoing I conceive to be the formulae of justice in declaratory
judgment actions. I derive them from the algebraic symbols found in this
edition of Borchard. If the formulae have fallacies the fault is mine. But
the symbols evolved by the master are faultless, I am sure.
It is a privilege to review this book. It has its human imperfection."
But itwill be many a day before the bar views again a text so forwardlooking in its conception and so completely adequate in its execution. From
the gold-leaf-on-red of its cover, through its exhaustive Table of Contents,
Footnotes, Appendix, Tables of Cases and Index the book has "class". It
is authoritative, complete and "required reading" for anyone who would
plumb the mysterious, mystic magic of declaratory judgments in all their
ramifications.
Johin F. X. Finn.t
A

By John H. Wigmore. Washington Law
Book Company, Washington, i94i. Pp. xxx, 751. Price: $5.oo.
The reviewer feels that this is the kind of book which is far better
understood and appreciated by the practicing attorney who has personally
KALFIDOSCOrE OF JUSTICE.

9. Space does not pcrmnit extended discussion of the intricacies of this problem.
They are found neatly presentced in three cases, which should be read together: N. Y.
Fo'reign Trade Zone Operators v. State Liquor Authority, 285 N. Y. 272, 34 N. E.(2d)
316 (i941); Reed v. Littleton, 275 N. Y. iso, 9 N. _.(2d) 814 (1937) ; Guide Escort
Service v. Moss, 26o App. Div. r,2o0 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 150 (1940). In the first case a
declaratory judgment was granted. In the two earlier cases such a judgment was
denied.

I

Io.At page xxxiv. line 6, the word "fr"should be "from". At page 645, line 17,
the word "privity" erroneously appears twice. At page 821, note 83. the printer gives
us "indispens'ble".. At page R26, line 28, he gives us "adjuidcation". At page 975,
line 7.a hyphen is omittcd. At page 979. line 14. reference is made to Surrogate
"Flynn". The Surrogate's name was not "Flynn" but "Sheils", and I certify to this
of my own knowledge, for when the late Mr. Surrogate Sheils'was my adversary at
the bar lie
put me through some very high paces indeed.
f Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University.
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had- courtroom experience, than the law school student who has simply
read cases f6r the purpose of mastering the principles of law. John H.
Wigmore, one of the most learned of the modern teachers of law, has
herein compiled a collection of trials such as have never appeared in one
volume previous to this time. The author portrays the very spirit of life
of peoples who lived through these various trials, and of the nations, and
parts of our own nation, where they occurred.
To fully grasp and understand these living actors in this living drama,
one must approach the collection from the viewpoint of the historian who
is going back to a way of life now decadent. There is no more fertile field
in which to delve for the purpose of learning how the minds of peoples
operated than to read these sample recordings of their comparative judicial
systems.
There runs throughout the early cases, regardless of location, whether
it be England, France or Germany, the strain of religion and church rule.
Especially is this true in the early Saxon trials by ordeal. Our forbears
believed strongly in the supernatural and the miraculous. They were
prone to link justice and the deity, and so great was the influence of the
church on court, that sometimes the former was carried into the latter
almost in toto. The oath that is today required of witnesses is the last
vestige of ;dealisin remaining in our present judicial system.
The greater number of cases recorded were those of a criminal natuie.
As even today it is the sensational murder trial that catches the eye of the
public, so ii these earlier times the trials which were recorded for posterity
by the scriveners were of that category. It is amazing to read how cunning
and wile were so well known and practiced in early times. In France, in
England, in China. and in other places, the judges and the lawyers constantly vied with one another in mental gymnastics, while today their respective positions are more definitely fixed by rules of procedure. Their
skill was built on a keen insight of human nature, unfettered by our present
technical rules of evidence. Especially was this true in China. There was
one notable judge who. during the conclusion of a trial of an innocent
young student charged with the murder of his sweetheart, sums up admirably the foundation of justice for him: "Your heart", said Judge Pao,
in conclusion, "beats, I am pleased to observe, in accordance with the
eternal principles of Right. I shall make it my business to forward your
prospects in life. . .

."

The justice of Frederick the Great ran like

this: "Firstl , to proceed to deal equally with all people seeking justice,
be it prince or peasant, for, there, all must be alike". 2 The span of space
and time has not altered the ideal sought-justice.
This volume gives ample opportunity to examine and compare the
manner and means of arriving at the proper verdict, as practiced formerly
and today, both at home and abroad. A fundamental concept is constantly
being reduced to its lowest common denominator. That denominator is
the proper or just thing to do when all the facts are in.
The flavor of the nerve tingling situation; the hard mind, the cultured
wit. are all abundantly depicted. A true practicing student of law will be
both delighted and enlightened from a reading of this composite picture
of the world at judicial work.
Leonard L. Ettinger.t
i. Page

272.

2. Page 125.

f Member of the Philadelphia Bar.

